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Abstract 
Since it is common among households to use more than one form of microinsurance, this paper 
estimates the uptake of different kinds of microinsurance by the same population. We use a 
multivariate probit model, which examines the participation in the different forms of insurance 
simultaneously. By doing this, we can establish whether participation patterns in different types 
of microinsurance options indicates if the participation in specific insurance schemes is 
complementary or a substitute. We establish that membership of a microfinance institution 
means that households are more likely to have purchased an insurance policy. Furthermore, the 
study describes a need for more inclusive and composite packages of microinsurance products 
for greater financial inclusion of the poor. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, the evolution of microinsurance as a risk-mitigation strategy has opened up 
choices for managing the vulnerability of low-income households. Using risk pooling in return 
for regular affordable premium payments, microinsurance schemes have responded to the 
limited and variable cash flows of low-income households, and their often uneven economic 
environment. In the literature, studies on micro health (e.g. Asfaw 2003, Bhat and Jain 2006, 
Jütting 2003, Ito and Kono 2010, Hamid et al. 2010), micro life (e.g. Giesbert et al. 2011; Arun et 
al. 2012), and on rainfall insurance (e.g. Giné et al. 2008, Giné and Yang 2009, Cole et al. 2009) 
have identified determinants of insurance participation in developing countries. A recent review 
(Eling et al., 2014) highlights the role of contract performance (including risk and quality), trust, 
financial literacy and informal risk-sharing mechanisms in expanding microinsurance markets. It 
is a common phenomenon that several households use more than one form of insurance, and 
this study identifies what affects a household’s decision to take up micro life, health, vehicle or 
any other type of microinsurance. This paper contributes to the literature through an 
examination of different types of microinsurance which offer complementary and/or substitute 
alternatives, given budget constraints for households in Sri Lanka, and a simultaneous estimation 
of the patterns of actual usage, i.e. common and differing features, in different types of 
microinsurance. The findings of the study provide valuable insights for innovation in the product 
structure through the take-up of several classes of risk.  
 
Furthermore, we establish that households which purchase insurance may have unobservable 
characteristics because of their membership of a microfinance institution (MFI), which – we 
argue – makes them more likely already to have purchased an insurance policy. Therefore, we 
limit the sample under study to those households whose members use at least one 
product/service from MFI, and estimate probit models to identify the determining factors of a 
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household’s insurance participation. When estimating the determinants of insurance uptake in 
this way there is scope for endogeneity, i.e. the decision to join the MFI is endogenous to 
insurance demand. Therefore, we use the estimates for comparison with the determinants of the 
participation in different types of insurance estimated in the multivariate probit models to test 
their conflicting or substitution outcome. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses theoretical perspectives on 
microinsurance participation, followed by a discussion on data and methods, with descriptive 
statistics, in Section 3. Section 4 provides a discussion on estimates and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Perspectives on Microinsurance Participation 
 
In a simple scenario, Giné et al. (2008) consider a model of insurance participation with 
symmetric information. The model assumes a risk-averse household with quadratic expected 
utility, i.e. consistent with a household with CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) utility facing 
normally distributed shocks (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, Giné et al. 2008). Based on these 
assumptions, it predicts that a household’s willingness to pay for an insurance contract (i) 
increases if the household is more risk averse, (ii) increases with the expected insurance payout, 
(iii) increases with the size of the insured risks, and (iv) decreases with basis risks. Willingness to 
pay for security depends on the degree of risk aversion of the household; conversely, the uptake 
of insurance increases with the household’s risk aversion. However, it is obvious that the uptake 
rate of microinsurance is still low, so that several households, for various reasons, remain 
uninsured against significant income risks.  
 
Deviating from the simple yet full information model described above, adverse selection and 
moral hazard are often largely seen as potential explanations for barriers to insurance 
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participation (Akerlof 1970, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Browne and Doerpinghaus 1993, 
Cawley and Phillipson 1999). In the case of life or health insurance, the insurance-providing 
institution cannot fully determine whether an individual is at high or low risk of death. Although 
the national life expectancy and health status is public information, to observe these on a case by 
case basis requires a lengthy and inefficient use of time, costs and human resources. If the 
households have differential risks and do not charge a premium equal to the expected marginal 
cost of insurance, the possible adverse selection can lead to problems in the nature and patterns 
of participation in the microinsurance schemes. 
 
Giesbert et al. (2011) find indications of adverse selection in micro life insurance participation. 
There is further evidence for the prevalence of adverse selection, as households having a higher 
ratio of sick members are more likely to purchase micro health insurance (Ito and Kono 2010). 
Adverse selection seems to be one reason, in combination with mistrust in the providers and 
unfamiliarity with insurance, for low take-up rates, high claim rates and low renewal rates. The 
providers are faced with difficult challenges in managing the incentive problems and 
simultaneously educating the poor. Incentive structures such as solidarity-enhancing rules seem 
to result in individual interests being restrained by group interests, whereas co-payment rules may 
be a strong deterrent to very poor households (Hamid et al. 2010). Moral hazard may also exist 
in the setting of microinsurance markets, if the household lives with less caution, risks more after 
contracting microinsurance, omits precautionary actions and overuses care; the last is a major 
problem, particularly for health insurance (Pauly 2004). In this paper, we test for the presence of 
adverse selection in micro life and health insurance participation in Sri Lanka. 
 
To consider arguments from existing theoretical work on the demand for life insurance, we offer 
predictions from the model presented by Lewis (1989), which explicitly includes the preferences 
of the dependants and beneficiaries. This model posits the demand for life insurance as a 
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maximization problem of the beneficiaries, spouse and offspring of the policy holder. The 
household’s willingness to pay for life insurance will then (i) increase with the probability of the 
breadwinner’s death, (ii) increase with the degree of risk aversion, (iii) increase in the present 
value of the beneficiaries’ consumption, (iv) decrease with the policy loading factor, and (v) 
decrease with the household’s wealth (Lewis 1989). From this model, we derive the outcome that 
the present value of the beneficiaries’ consumption increases with the number of dependants 
within the household (Arun and Bendig 2010). A household’s micro life insurance participation 
seems to be associated with the number of dependants, especially young dependants, and the 
marital status “being married”, due to intended bequest motives expressing a “joy-of-giving” 
motive (Hurd 1987, Hurd 1994, Inkmann and Michaelides 2010). Further, we assume that 
participation in micro health insurance is positively linked to the household size, as household 
heads seem to have strong incentives to insure the entire household (Dror et al. 2007). In 
particular, female-led households are more likely to be enrolled in health insurance, reflecting the 
traditional role of women as the main health caregivers in the family (Khandker 1998, Chankova 
et al. 2008), so we control for this as well. 
 
Both underlying models show an association between insurance participation and the degree of 
risk aversion. In the context of a developed country, there is evidence of a life-cycle effect on the 
degree of an individual’s risk aversion in life insurance participation, although the latter decreases 
after a certain amount of wealth, income or age (Barsky et al. 1997). Therefore, it is plausible to 
assume that better-off households are better able and willing to bear a given amount of risk than 
are relatively poor households. For developing countries, there is evidence that risk-averse 
households are less likely to purchase an index-based, agricultural microinsurance (Giné et al. 
2008) and that households who feel themselves more exposed to risk are less likely to use micro 
life insurance (Giesbert et al. 2011). This may explain why risky households, i.e. households who 
feel themselves more exposed to risk, have poorer access to insurance. Recently, Eling et. al 
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(2013) examined the literature on microinsurance demand and compared it with evidence in the 
literature regarding traditional insurance markets. This study identifies the key factors affecting 
microinsurance demand, and further highlights the role of contract performance (including basis 
risk and quality), trust, financial literacy and informal risk-sharing mechanisms in expanding 
microinsurance markets. However, exposure to shocks has an influence on the use of insurance, 
although it differs for the tested risks (Giesbert et al. 2011, Bendig and Arun 2011a). Thus, we 
control for both the degree of risk aversion and previous risk exposure in our analysis. 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics 
The data for the analysis in this paper is based on a household survey conducted during 2007-08 
in various villages covering all districts and regions in Sri Lanka. In total, 330 households were 
interviewed in 30 villages, drawn from two strata of (micro) insured and non-insured households, 
of which 240 households have and 90 do not have any insurance, including insurance policies 
offered by institutions other than the five MFIs listed below (see Arun et al. 2012 for further 
details). Households within each stratum (the insured and the non-insured households) were 
chosen through random sampling. The heads of the 240 insured households are members of an 
MFI, associated with one, and/or at least use some financial services, i.e. all 240 insured 
households are MFI members2. Of these, 142 households had purchased a life insurance policy, 
29 health insurance, 62 vehicle insurance and 54 another type of insurance (Table 1). These 
insurance purchases are not exclusive, i.e. there are households which use more than one 
insurance type. The inter-dependencies or cross influences of one class of risk and others are a 
major concern and the credit life is dominant in the other insurance category in our sample. 
                                                 
2 In our questionnaire we asked the households for the date of the insurance purchase or, in the 
case of loans, for the date of the loan disbursement. We have no comparable information for 
savings products and current accounts which are additionally offered by the MFIs. Therefore, we 
cannot provide comprehensive information on the duration of membership of an MFI.  
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Table 1: Types and Distribution of Insurance under the Dependent Variable “Other 
Insurance”3 
Type of insurance 
 
N Share (in 
percentage) 
Life cycle insurance 3 5.5 
Property insurance 1 1.9 
Credit insurance 37 68.5 
Age insurance 8 14.8 
Other insurance 5 9.3 
Total 54 100 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
As a first step, the main suppliers of voluntary microinsurance for low-income households were 
identified in order to select the insured households (for a detailed account of the microinsurance 
sector in Sri Lanka, see Arun et al. 2011); see Table 2. The five MFIs are WDF, WDBF, Sanasa, 
Yasiru and SEEDS.  
Table 2: Distribution across MFIs 
Regions 
 
N Share (in 
percentage) 
WDF 40 12.1 
WDBF 65 19.7 
Sanasa 65 19.7 
Yasiru 64 19.4 
SEEDS 96 29.1 
Total 330 100.00 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
The total number of households – insured and non-insured – selected from the villages linked to 
the outreach of each of the five institutions varies from 40 to 96. In total, only 40 households – 
insured and non-insured – were linked to the villages and districts where WDF operates (i.e. 
Hambantota), while 95 households were associated with the outreach area of SEEDS, which 
operates throughout the country. 65 households were related to the areas covered by the other 
three institutions. 
                                                 
3 The use of the insurance types covered under this category is not mutually exclusive. 
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The survey sampling frame is a census of households across 30 villages covering all 14 districts 
(and the nine regions, Table 3) in which these MFIs operate.  
Table 3: Distribution across Regions 
Regions 
 
N Share (in 
percentage) 
West 70 21.2 
South 51 15.5 
Central 69 20.9 
North Central 25 7.6 
UVA 45 13.6 
North 15 4.5 
East 15 4.5 
North West 20 6.1 
Subura 20 6.1 
Total 330 100.00 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Two or three MFIs were selected from each district, except for Vavuniya and Batticaloa, located 
in the Northern and Eastern provinces where only SEEDS is present, due to the high density of 
insured households. In total, the 30 villages selected are at least representative of all villages in 
which microinsurance is accessible via the selected MFIs. As microfinance is clearly concentrated 
in rural areas, the underlying survey is representative of villages in rural areas of Sri Lanka. We 
used the client bases of the five MFIs to select randomly the households for the insured strata. 
The selected number of households from each institution was allocated randomly across the 
districts in which they operate. In consultation with the district branch managers and respective 
staff members – to ensure a high density of insured households – we listed all eligible villages in 
the districts and then selected randomly from the list two or three villages in each district 
representing the selected MFIs in that district.  
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The non-insured had to be randomly picked from the lists of households from existing CBOs 
(Community Based Organizations) in these villages; these are not exclusively associated with any 
of the five MFIs and have not purchased any insurance. The CBOs are used as a proxy sample 
for the non-insured group, according to limited financial resources for the survey. The non-
insured group is therefore representative of non-insured households which are members in the 
covered types of CBO. The CBOs selected are not involved in the microfinance activities of the 
microinsurance providers, but are involved, for instance, in community strengthening, 
infrastructure, health or economic issues beyond microfinance. For each village, one CBO was 
picked at random from a list of existing CBOs created with the help of the branch manager and 
the staff members of the MFIs in the district. From the selected CBO members,the households 
were randomly picked for the interviews. The number of insured and non-insured households 
selected from each village ranged from 10 to 15.  
 
Table 8 (in Appendix) summarizes the definition of the variables in the estimates. We include 
different household characteristics, such as demographic and wealth variables, the level of 
education and economic activities of heads of households, information about remittances 
received by the household, the subjective risk assessment of the head, the household’s previous 
risk exposure, and regional dummies. To avoid potential endogeneity problems, we constructed 
an asset index, which is controlled for so that none of the financial services contracted are used 
to purchase any asset. The index variable “risk assessment” is constructed from three questions 
using principal component factor analysis: one related to the household’s self-perception of 
exposure to health shocks, weather and environment-related shocks; one related to economic 
shocks compared with neighbouring households; and one about the household’s own rating of 
its willingness to take risks, using factor analysis4.  
                                                 
44 The index is built by using a principal component factor analysis method using the following 
data points/questions described: The questions for the self-perception of exposure to health 
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Sample characteristics are summarized in the descriptive statistics for insurance participation 
(Table 2) and for micro life, health, vehicle and other insurance participation (Table 3). The 
proportion of female households is higher among insurance non-buyers than among insurance 
buyers; only 17% of the households are female-headed. The share of female-headed households 
which participate in micro life, health or vehicle insurance is even smaller. Insurance buyers for 
all the types of insurance covered live in larger households, and among them is a slightly higher 
share of married household heads than among non-buyers. The ratio of ill household members is 
significantly higher among participants, especially in micro health, than among non-participants. 
Insurance buyers are significantly older than insurance non-buyers. Among the insurance buyers, 
the households own more land, have more remittance receipts, a lower share of uneducated, 
primary- or secondary-educated household heads, and a lower share of self-employed heads than 
among the insurance non-buyers. In Sri Lanka, insurance buyers belong to wealthier households 
than non-buyers (Bendig and Arun, 2011b). The households which have purchased any of the 
underlying types of insurance have a significantly higher risk-assessment index in Sri Lanka. A 
higher share of insurance and especially micro health insurance buyers had experienced the 
severe illness of a household member than was the case for non-buyers. The same is true for 
health insurance users in the case of experience of any other severe shock.
                                                                                                                                                        
shocks, weather and environment-related shocks and economic shocks are, e.g. for health 
shocks: “In your opinion, is your household more or less exposed to health shocks/family 
related shocks compared to other households in your village?.” The response categories are then 
(1) Much more, (2) A bit more, (3) About the same, (4) A bit less, (5) Much less. The question 
for the households’ own rating of its willingness to take risks is: “How do you see yourself: Are 
you rather willing or unwilling to take risks? (Imagine a case, where at a certain cost you may 
receive a benefit, but which is not certain)”. The households were asked to rank their willingness 
on a scale where the value 0 means “unwilling to take risks” and the value 5 means “willing to 
take risks”. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics: Insurance Buyers vs. Non-Buyers 
Variable Full Sample Insurance Buyers Insurance Non-Buyers Statistical Difference between 
Insurance Buyers/Non-Buyers 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Std. Dev. 
Female head 0.169 0.376 0.163 0.369 0.189 0.394 0.026 0.047 
Household size 4.094 1.419 4.204 1.413 3.800 1.399 -0.404*** 0.174 
Married 0.861 0.347 0.871 0.336 0.833 0.375 -0.038 0.043 
Ratio of ill household members 0.393 0.414 0.409 0.419 0.349 0.401 -0.069* 0.051 
Age 47.88 11.70 47.41 11.53 49.12 12.14 1.714 1.446 
Age squared 2,428.7 1,171.03 2,379.9 1,134.54 2,558.8 1,260.58 178.98 144.63 
Education of household head (base: 
tertiary education) 
        
No or only primary education 0.191 0.394 0.171 0.377 0.244 0.432 0.074 0.049 
Secondary education 0.409 0.492 0.40 0.49 0.433 0.498 0.033 0.061 
Occupation of household head (base: 
formal employee/employer) 
        
Head is self-employed 0.594 0.492 0.579 0.495 0.633 0.485 0.054 0.061 
Head is unemployed 0.221 0.416 0.221 0.416 0.222 0.418 0.001 0.051 
Asset index -1.9e-09 1.000 0.126 0.985 -0.337 0.967 -0.464*** 0.121 
Quintile 1 0.2 0.400 0.167 0.373 0.289 0.456 0.122 0.049 
Quintile 2 0.2 0.400 0.179 0.384 0.256 0.439 0.077 0.049 
Quintile 3 0.2 0.400 0.2 0.401 0.2 0.402 0 0.049 
Quintile 4 0.2 0.400 0.221 0.416 0.144 0.354 -0.076* 0.049 
Land ownership 0.773 0.419 0.825 0.381 0.633 0.485 -0.192*** 0.051 
Remittance 0.051 0.221 0.054 0.227 0.044 0.207 -0.009 0.027 
Household’s self-perception of risk 9.9e-09 1.000 0.009 1.041 -0.025 0.887 -0.034 0.124 
Household’s risk experience (base: 
no risk experience) 
        
Experienced death of a household 
member 
0.073 0.260 0.071 0.257 0.078 0.269 0.007 0.032 
Experienced severe illness of a 
household member 
0.142 0.350 0.158 0.366 0.1 0.302 -0.058* 0.043 
Experienced other severe risk 0.336 0.473 0.333 0.472 0.344 0.478 0.011 0.059 
MFI member 0.921 0.269 1.000 0.000 0.711 0.456 -0.289*** 0.029 
Observations 330 240 90 328  
Source: Authors’ calculation. Statistical differences are calculated with mean comparison tests (t-statistics). *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics: Life, Health, Vehicle and other Insurance Buyers vs. Non-
Buyers 
Variable Full Sample Life Insurance 
Buyers 
Health Insurance 
Buyers 
Vehicle Insurance 
Buyers 
Other Insurance 
Buyers 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Female head 0.169 0.376 0.148 0.356 0.138 0.351 0.065 0.031 0.227 0.063 
Household size 4.094 1.419 4.296* 1.496 4.345 1.317 4.129 0.141 4.045 0.213 
Married head 0.861 0.347 0.880 0.326 0.931 0.258 0.984*** 0.016 0.750 0.065 
Ratio of ill household 
members 
0.393 0.414 0.397 0.409 0.413 0.376 0.529*** 0.056 0.351** 0.066 
Age 47.88 11.70 48.23 11.60 50.21 10.88 45.27 1.35 46.81* 1.80 
Age squared 2,428.7 1,171.03 2,459.9 1,153.15 2,634.9 1,119.26 2,161.0 123.28 2,331.9* 179.7 
Education of household 
head (base: tertiary 
education) 
          
No or only primary 
education 
0.191 0.394 0.183 0.388 0.241 0.435 0.065 0.031 0.205 0.062 
Secondary Education 0.409 0.492 0.408 0.493 0.517* 0.509 0.290 0.058 0.432 0.076 
Occupation of 
household head (base: 
formal 
employee/employer) 
          
Head is self-employed 0.594 0.492 0.648** 0.479 0.517 0.509 0.484 0.064 0.590** 0.075 
Head is unemployed 0.221 0.416 0.218 0.415 0.207 0.412 0.226 0.054 0.227 0.064 
Asset Index -1.9e-09 1.000 0.180*** 0.988 0.112 1.056 0.675*** 0.097 -0.079 0.156 
Quintile 1 0.2 0.400 0.148 0.356 0.241 0.435 0.032 0.022 0.227 0.064 
Quintile 2 0.2 0.400 0.176 0.382 0.069 0.258 0.161 0.047 0.181 0.059 
Quintile 3 0.2 0.400 0.211 0.409 0.276 0.455 0.113 0.041 0.181 0.059 
Quintile 4 0.2 0.400 0.190 0.393 0.138 0.351 0.274** 0.057 0.227 0.064 
Land Ownership 0.773 0.419 0.845*** 0.363 0.793 0.412 0.887*** 0.040 0.750 0.066 
Remittance 0.051 0.221 0.056 0.231 0.069 0.258 0.048 0.027 0.068*** 0.038 
Household’s self-
perception of risk 
9.9e-09 1.000 -0.054 0.878 0.086 1.143 -0.029 0.132 0.120 0.177 
Household’s risk 
experience (base: no risk 
experience) 
          
Experienced death of a 
household member 
0.073 0.260 0.070 0.257 0.034 0.186 0.081 0.035 0.068 0.038 
Experienced severe 
illness of a household 
member 
0.142 0.350 0.190** 0.394 0.345*** 0.484 0.097 0.037 0.113 0.048 
Experienced other 
severe risk 
0.336 0.473 0.373* 0.485 0.414 0.501 0.274 0.057 0.205*** 0.062 
MFI member 0.921 0.269 1.000*** 0.000 1.000** 0.000 1.000** 0.000 1.000* 0.000 
Observations 330 142 29 62 54 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Statistical differences are calculated with mean comparison tests (t-
statistics) related to the non-participation subgroups (e.g. non-life insured). The significance level 
of the mean difference is presented via asterixes at the mean values, such as  *** significant at 1 
percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
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3.2 Methodology 
 
A household’s decision to buy insurance can be for different reasons. For instance, the law 
requires vehicle owners to have vehicle insurance. The signing of a credit life insurance is often 
required by respective MFIs for the approval of a credit application Therefore, we examine the 
actual usage of different types of (micro)insurance by households in Sri Lanka. When estimating 
the determinants of insurance uptake based on cross-sectional data, one encounters the 
important challenge of dealing with the problems of both endogeneity and self-selection (Jütting 
2003). Therefore, we treat any implication of a causal relationship with caution and control as far 
as possible for potential endogeneity issues; thus, for instance, we apply an adjusted asset index. 
Household heads who self-select the insurance uptake may have unobservable characteristics – 
related to preference or existing enrolment in an MFI – which make it more likely for them to 
participate in an insurance scheme (mainly offered by such MFIs) and which may influence their 
decision to use insurance (Waters 1999).  
 
We apply a multivariate probit model for the use of different types of insurance, i.e. life, health, 
vehicle and other. Since preliminary analyses of our four outcomes of interest revealed that there 
may be a correlation between the different outcome categories and that the use of any one type 
of insurance is not exclusive (i.e. there are households who have more than one insurance type), 
we assume that households’ choices of different types of insurance are interrelated. The 
multivariate probit model enables us to estimate four dichotomous dependent variables 
simultaneously, and to explicitly model the correlation in disturbance terms, using a method of 
simulated maximum likelihood. Therefore, we use it to estimate the determinants of the four 
different types of insurance, which is given by: 
                 LLXL εβ += ´*   1* =L  if 0* >L , 0 otherwise, 
HHXH εβ += ´*  1* =H  if 0* >H , 0 otherwise, 
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VVXV εβ += ´*  1* =V  if 0* >V , 0 otherwise, 
OOXO εβ += ´*  1* =O  if 0* >O , 0 otherwise, 
 
where L*, H*, V* and O* are the true, unobserved propensities to use life insurance, 
health insurance, vehicle insurance or any other insurance. The term X´ represents the vector of 
independent variables, i.e. the socio-demographic control variables. We assume that the 
distribution of the four outcomes is multivariate normal, i.e.:  
 
0][][][ === OHL EEE εεε   and  1][][][ === OHL VarVarVar εεε  
 
In multivariate probit models the computation of marginal effects is difficult. We 
therefore calculate the average partial effects (APEs) on the marginal probabilities of the 
independent variables for each equation by averaging sample partial effects.  
 
To control for self-selection, we utilize a binary probit model to estimate the household’s 
decision for insurance participation limited to the sub-sample of households enrolled in an MFI. 
We hypothesize that, after controlling for individual, household and regional characteristics, 
members of an MFI have better access to, and thus are more likely to use, insurance than are 
non-members. Therefore, we investigate the effect of the determinants of a household’s use of 
insurance on the sub-sample of the households that were members of an MFI. In this way, our 
analysis is not faced with the problem of limited variance on the supply side, as all provinces and 
the five major microinsurance providers are covered in the underlying survey.  
 
It is assumed that the insurance participation of a household (p) depends on the following 
factors: the wealth status of the household (w), characteristics of the household head (H), 
household characteristics (Z), regional characteristics (R)m and on the error term u, which is 
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uncovariant with the other regressors. The following equation is applied to the model using the 
described sample structure: 
),,,,( uRZHwfp iiii =  
In order to estimate the probability of participation, we use a binary probit model:  
iiiii uRZHwp ++++= δφαβ*  
1* =ip  If, meaning the household I is a member of a MFI (equation 1) or uses 
insurance (equation2), 
0* =ip  Otherwise. 
 
4     Estimating the Participation Patterns of Different Microinsurance Schemes 
 
The results of the multivariate probit regressions for the analysis of a household’s insurance 
participation decision, i.e. what determines the use of micro life, health, vehicle and other forms 
of insurance, are presented in Table 5 and in Table 9 (in Appendix) showing the APEs of the 
explanatory variables on the marginal probability of using the different types of insurance. Two 
model specifications have been estimated for each dependent variable and estimation: the first 
one includes, among the other regressors, an asset endowment index as a continuous variable 
and the second uses dummies for asset endowment quintiles. Further, we calculated marginal 
effects for two reference5 households: (1) a female-headed household which has eight household 
members, a head of household aged 45 years with no formal or only primary education, but self-
employed, with an asset endowment index of zero, without any land, who receives remittances, 
has a risk assessment index of one, has experienced a death, the illness of a household member 
and an additional shock in the past five years; and (2) a male-headed household which has four 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that it may be better to create a benchmark value – a reference case – for 
which the marginal effects are calculated (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). The reference households 
were chosen to display two different, but typical household configurations. The first one is seen 
as the “highly vulnerable” reference household as its attributes include a female head with low 
educational attainment, small asset endowment and high exposure to risk. Household (2) is 
assumed to be the reference for a “less vulnerable” household as its characteristics include 
smaller size, higher educated head and higher asset endowment than its counterpart in reference 
(1).  
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household members, a head who has attained secondary education, an asset endowment index of 
two, without any remittances and, for the other variables, the same outcomes as the first 
reference household. Two explanatory variables – namely married head and the ratio of ill 
household members – are included here according to the relevance of bequest motives, 
particularly for micro life, and adverse selection for micro life and health insurance. 
 
It is important to note that the four outcome categories, i.e. the types of insurance, are not 
mutually exclusive. The estimated correlation coefficients, listed at the bottom of the tables, 
indicate that the residuals of the four outcome categories are correlated. Two of the estimated 
correlation coefficients are negative and statistically significant for Sri Lanka. The correlation 
coefficient between the unexplained part of the use of micro health and vehicle insurance 
amounts to -0.33 and between micro vehicle and other insurance to -0.68, suggesting that there 
exist unobservable characteristics of the household that influence the household’s decision to 
purchase health or vehicle insurance, and likewise vehicle or any other form of insurance. This 
outcome shows that from the household’s perspective the participation in health or vehicle and 
vehicle or any other form of insurance are conflicting alternatives. Furthermore, it suggests that 
households who buy health insurance are also more likely to buy life insurance. This might be 
related, for instance, to private information associated with their mortality risk (or at least to 
unobserved covariates correlated with mortality risk, or the household’s perception of mortality 
risk). 
 
In line with the literature, female headship of a household is positively associated with the use of 
micro health insurance in Sri Lanka, which may reflect a higher incentive to provide security, 
especially health care, to the household compared with male-headed households. This is 
confirmed by the fact that women are the main health caregivers in the family, a traditional role; 
thus, they prioritize more health-related expenditure for the family than do men, including the 
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premium paid to a micro health insurance scheme. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
women are often the main target group of specific microcredit programmes, and thus more likely 
to contract micro health insurance. 
 
From the predictions of the model for life insurance demand, we expected a positive relationship 
between household size and the participation in micro life insurance due to bequest motives. 
Indeed, we find a positive association for micro life insurance. In our first specification, 
household size, indicating the number of dependants in the household, is an economically and 
statistically significant predictor of micro life insurance participation due to an intended bequest 
motive (Arun et al. 2012). However, we find no significant relationship between micro life 
insurance participation and the marriage status of the head as the other possible bequest-related 
determinant. Nevertheless, the outcome shows that being married is significantly positively 
linked to the uptake of micro health and vehicle and negatively related to the use of any other 
form of insurance. Most notably, married household heads – similar to female-headed 
households – seem to have a higher propensity to internalize the costs and consequences related 
to health shocks and related care than have unmarried heads.  
 
In line with earlier findings in the literature, we find a significant positive outcome for the ratio 
of ill household members to participation in micro life and vehicle insurance. In the case of 
health insurance, the existence of adverse selection is not evident here, which might be related to 
the fact that this insurance type does not cover pre-existing conditions, or that households with 
many sick members may not be able to afford the up-front premiums. In addition, we find the 
right sign (though not statistically significant) for the covariate covering households experiencing 
a severe illness (z = 1.42). Instead, the death of a household member is actually predicting a 
higher probability of health insurance purchase, which is consistent with adverse selection, 
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assuming that mortality risk is correlated within the family, and that the death is preceded by 
illness. 
 
Further, our results show no life-cycle effect for any of the four insurance types, which indicates 
a U-shaped age pattern for Sri Lanka. There is significant evidence for such an age pattern for 
micro life participation, health and vehicle insurance. It appears that household heads are less 
willing to pay for insurance up to a specific age, after which their willingness increases due to 
higher incentives to protect their families from certain hazards. 
 
Deviating from the underlying theoretical model of Lewis and the bulk of the literature, we find 
that household heads with no formal, only primary or secondary, education are significantly 
more likely to buy life and health insurance than heads with tertiary or higher education. This 
implies that heads of households with a lower level of education are not excluded from 
microinsurance participation and are not less willing to pay for it than are highly educated heads. 
In contrast to the findings of Chankova et al. (2008) and Ito and Kono (2010), our results imply 
that the concept of micro health insurance is also capable of being understood by the less well 
educated heads. Moreover, we find that these households may have lower income-earning 
opportunities, so that they may have higher incentives to secure their families against the 
negative outcomes of certain shocks, such as death or sickness. We agree with previous 
contributions in the literature (Giné et al. 2008, Cole et al. 2009), that it would be better to use 
additional determinants related to financial literacy, especially insurance knowledge, to capture 
the relationship between the understanding of insurance concepts and the propensity for low-
income households to participate in different types of microinsurance schemes (Giné et al. 2008, 
Cole et al. 2009). 
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We find that self-employment and unemployment are negatively associated with the use of micro 
health insurance, and positively related to the uptake of any other insurance. Since we do not 
know much about the specific causality here, it is important to note that both occupational 
statuses are related to lower income-earning possibilities, which indicates a lower ability and 
willingness to pay for micro health. 
 
In line with the literature, we find that wealthier households in Sri Lanka, i.e. households with a 
higher asset endowment, are more likely to use micro life, health, vehicle or any other form of 
insurance. Due to the fact that households from the poorest quintile are significantly less likely to 
participate in a micro life, health, vehicle or any other insurance scheme compared to those from 
the richest quintile (Table 6), it seems that the poorest households have rather limited access to 
these microinsurance policies.  
 
From the predictions of the underlying standard neoclassical model and of the model of life 
insurance demand developed by Lewis (1989), we expected a positive relationship between the 
degree of risk aversion and the participation in any type of microinsurance. We confirm this 
expectation, as households perceiving themselves as being more exposed to risk are more likely 
to participate in a micro health insurance scheme in both specifications (Table 7) and in any 
other insurance scheme in the first specification. This implies that micro health insurance seems 
to be seen by the households in Sri Lanka as a risk-coping mechanism and not as an additional 
risk. 
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Table 6: Multivariate Probit Results on the Type of Insurance for Sri Lanka (I) 
Variable Life Insurance Health Insurance Vehicle Insurance Other Insurance 
APEs z-stat. APEs z-stat. APEs z-stat. APEs z-stat. 
Female head 0.118 0.72 0.003 2.94*** 0.029 1.70* -0.011 -1.70* 
Household size 0.066 4.12** 0.0001 0.95 0.003 0.91 0.0040 1.52 
Married head 0.067 0.78 0.0002 3.20*** 0.021 4.38*** -0.195 -3.87*** 
Ratio of ill 
household members 
0.381 2.08** -0.00009 -0.87 0.131 4.04*** -0.002 -0.25 
Age -0.031 -3.72*** -0.00004 -2.20** -0.005 -5.15*** -0.0007 -0.31 
Age squared 0.0003 3.88*** 5.43e-07 2.37** 0.00006 4.69*** -2.17e-06 -0.08 
Education of 
household head 
(base: tertiary 
education) 
        
No or only primary 
education 
0.467 3.66*** 0.085 3.23*** 0.027 2.55*** 0.003 0.44 
Secondary 
Education 
0.103 2.55*** 0.003 2.19** 0.003 0.66 0.004 0.66 
Occupation of 
household head 
(base: formal 
employee/employer) 
        
Head is self-
employed 
0.077 1.51 -0.0001 -1.82* -0.011 -1.21 0.009 1.68* 
Head is unemployed 0.009 0.14 -0.0001 -3.01*** -0.006 -0.97 0.008 1.82* 
Asset Index 0.306 7.34*** 0.011 3.79*** 0.229 5.62*** 0.015 2.26** 
Land Ownership 0.049 0.88 -0.0001 -0.32 -0.007 -0.75 -0.007 -0.71 
Remittance 0.148 1.97** -0.0001 -1.23 0.0016 0.13 0.157 2.37** 
Self risk assessment 0.003 0.10 0.0001 1.95** 0.004 0.72 0.004 2.30** 
Household’s risk 
experience (base: no 
risk experience) 
        
Experienced death 
of a household 
member 
0.199 1.14 0.002 3.03*** -0.009 -1.36 0.043 1.97** 
Experienced severe 
illness 
-0.093 -2.30** 0.008 1.42 -0.017 -4.37*** -0.007 -1.37 
Experienced other 
severe shock 
-0.150 -4.06*** 0.0001 0.51 -0.039 -3.78*** -0.011 -2.61*** 
Regional dummies Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
Est. correlation 
coeff. 
ρ21 = 0.05 0.48 ρ31 = 0.03 0.16 ρ41 = -0.13 -0.72 ρ32 = -0.33 -2.88*** 
ρ42 = 0.03 0.21 ρ43 = -0.68 -2.20**     
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Note: Results of the multivariate probit model are estimated by SML with 20 pseudo-random 
draws. The z-statistics refer to the estimated coefficients and are based on robust standard 
errors. Average partial effects (APEs) are calculated with respect to the marginal probability of 
each type of insurance. The model also includes a constant. Sample size is N = 330 observations. 
*** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
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The results confirm that the situation differs according to whether and how the exposure to 
shocks, i.e. the tested three-risk dummies, is associated with participation in any type of 
microinsurance. It appears that the experience of a household member’s death is related to 
participation in a micro health and any other kind of insurance in the first specification. The 
occurrence of a severe illness is negatively related to the use of life and vehicle insurance. The 
same is true for the experience of any additional other severe shock for the uptake of micro life, 
vehicle or any other form of insurance in the first specification. Therefore, it seems plausible that 
households who have experienced a household-related shock – especially the death of a 
household member – have a higher incentive to secure against the negative outcome of such a 
shock in the future, whereas after the experience of a household member’s illness or any other 
severe shock the household may not regard insurance as an appropriate risk-management tool, as 
it may not have the ability or financial resources for the purchase, or access may be restricted.  
 
In order to analyze whether these results are specific to each type of microinsurance studied 
here, the estimation outcomes of the microinsurance participation decision, i.e. a household’s 
microinsurance participation conditional on MFI membership, as estimated using a conditional 
probit model, are presented in Table 7. We find that household size is significantly positively 
linked to microinsurance participation. The results imply that larger households may have a 
greater incentive to use their limited resources to obtain risk-reducing effects, as they are 
commonly more exposed to family-related risks. The age of the household head is significantly 
related to microinsurance participation. The turning point is 57 years of age, which implies that 
household heads do not request more insurance with increasing age. One explanation may be 
that older household heads with MFI membership are less educated and thus less able to 
understand microinsurance products and markets than their younger counterparts. 
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In contrast to our expectations and previous findings, we find for microinsurance uptake which 
is conditional on a household’s MFI enrolment, that no formal, either primary or secondary, 
education is positively correlated with microinsurance uptake. On the other hand, this implies 
that the commonly identified constraint of poor understanding of insurance products among 
lower-educated households might be removed if these households are MFI members; vice versa 
this might not be related to better understanding but to convincing marketing measures of the 
MFIs, so that the households could have a poor understanding and so be over-insured. Our 
results indicate that households from the richest quintile are more likely to participate in 
microinsurance than those from the poorest quintiles (Table 5), which may indicate reduced 
accessibility to MFIs by the poor.  
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Table7: Institution Membership and Participation Conditional on Membership in Sri 
Lanka 
Variable Purchased Conditional 
on Membership 
Purchased Conditional 
on Membership 
(I) (II) 
Female head -0.0021 -0.0069 
Household size 0.0069*** 0.0055** 
Age -0.0036** -0.0029** 
Age squared 0.00003* 0.00003** 
Education of household head (base: tertiary 
education) 
  
No or only primary education 0.6278*** 0.2097 
Secondary Education 0.0118 0.0075 
Occupation of household head (base: formal 
employee/employer) 
  
Head is self-employed 0.0125 0.0098 
Head is unemployed 0.0096 0.0039 
Asset Index 0.0171*** - 
Asset Quintiles (base: richest 20%)   
Quintile 1 - -0.2621*** 
Quintile 2 - -0.0251*** 
Quintile 3 - -0.0781*** 
Quintile 4 - 0.0033 
Land Ownership -0.0017 0.0046** 
Remittance 0.5448 0.6719** 
Self risk assessment 0.0031** 0.0017 
Household’s risk experience (base: no risk 
experience) 
  
Experienced death of a household member 0.1648 0.0361 
Experienced severe illness -0.0029 -0.0043** 
Experienced other severe shock  -0.0422* -0.0419* 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 304 304 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Note: Probit model coefficients are normalized to display marginal effects. ***significant at 1 
percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
 
Consistent with the neoclassical model with CARA utility and symmetric information presented 
by Giné, Townsend and Vickery (2008), we find that households with MFI members perceiving 
themselves as riskier are significantly more likely to have microinsurance. This indicates that 
households may not see insurance as an additional risk which is related to mistrust in the MFI 
and its staff or to misunderstanding of the offered microinsurance products. In contradiction to 
earlier findings by Giesbert et al. (2011), we find a positive association of remittances with 
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microinsurance uptake. Further, we find for the three risk-dummies that households who 
experienced an additional shock are significantly less likely to use microinsurance. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The findings of this study show uptake of different kinds of microinsurance by the same 
population. We find that self-employment and unemployment are negatively associated with the 
use of micro health insurance, and positively related to the uptake of any other insurance. 
Household size is positively associated with the use of micro life insurance – presumably due to 
an intended bequest motive – and any other form of microinsurance in Sri Lanka. The female-
headship of a household is positively associated with the use of micro health insurance, which is 
also true for married heads of households. Since the educational level of the household head has 
emerged as a strong determinant of a household’s microinsurance participation, the 
implementation and promotion of insurance education measures by the MFIs is recommended, 
in order to improve a household’s understanding of and knowledge about insurance. This would 
reduce mistrust in the providing institutions, among both target groups and existing clients in the 
community. In the long run, this may lead to more financially capable individuals and 
households who can make informed decisions about microinsurance participation, especially in 
rural communities. The paper further indicate the need for inclusive microinsurance products 
with composite packages for greater financial inclusion of the poor. Broadly, the findings of the 
paper indicate that although existing programmes have the potential to function as effective ex 
ante risk-management strategies, there is still a strong need to build up an insurance culture 
among the poor in Sri Lanka. 
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Appendix 
Table 8: Definition of Explanatory Variables for Sri Lanka 
Variable Description 
Female head Dummy variable, 1 if household is headed by a female, 0 otherwise 
Household size Household size 
Married head Dummy variable, 1 if household head is married, 0 otherwise 
Ratio of ill household 
members 
Ratio of ill household members in the previous 12 months to the total number of household 
members 
Age Age of the household head 
Age squared Age of the household head squared 
No or only primary 
education 
Dummy variable, 1 if household has no or only primary education, 0 otherwise 
Secondary education Dummy variable, 1 if household has secondary education, 0 otherwise 
Head is self-
employed 
Dummy variable, 1 if household head is self-employed or a contractual worker in either 
agriculture or non-agricultural activities, 0 otherwise 
Head is unemployed Dummy variable, 1 if household head is not employed due to young or old age, disability, or 
similar reasons, 0 otherwise  
Assets Assets (for Sri Lanka: motorcycle, bicycle, jewellery, refrigerator, sewing machine, electric iron, 
water heater, fan, TV, DVD, radio, fixed phone, mobile phone, main source of drinking, toilet 
facility, main source of lighting) owned by the household and was not purchased by a loan, 
index created by factor analysis 
Quintile 1-5 Five asset index quintiles labeled as Quintile 1 to 5, Quintile 1 is the poorest quintile and 
Quintile 5 is the quintile of households with the highest asset endowment.  
Dummy variables, 1 if household belong to the asset index quintile, 0 otherwise. (Quintile 5 
functions as reference category) 
Land ownership Dummy variable, if the household owns any land, 0 otherwise 
Remittance Dummy variable, 1 if household receives remittances from former household members who 
have migrated, 0 otherwise 
Household’s self-
perception of risk 
Household’s assessment of own risk situation (subjective exposure to health shocks, weather 
and environment related shocks, and economic shocks compared with neighbours, own rating 
of willingness to take risks), index created by factor analysis 
Experienced 
Death of a household 
member 
Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced the death of a household member in the last five 
years and this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household needed more than one month to 
recover, 0 otherwise  
Experienced 
Illness of a household 
member 
Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced the illness of a household member in the last five 
years and this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household needed more than one month to 
recover, 0 otherwise 
Experienced other 
severe shock 
Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced a severe shock6 other than the previous 
described shock in the last five years and this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household 
needed more than one month to recover from the economic consequences, which is in this 
case to reach the same income earnings level as before the shock occurred, 0 otherwise  
Locational/Regional 
dummies 
Dummy variables, 1 if household resides in the region, and 0 otherwise. Nine dummy variables 
(Western, Southern, North Western, North, Central, Sabara, North Central, Uva and Western 
region) are used in the analysis. The Central region functions a reference category. 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
 
  
                                                 
6 A shock is here understood as an unexpected or unpredictable event that affects a household 
negatively. A shock is severe if it affects the household income generating abilities in such 
amount that the household is in danger to not cover its day to day exspenses at least for a period 
of one month. 
 31
Table 9: Multivariate Probit Results on the Type of Insurance for Sri Lanka (II) 
Variable Life Insurance Health Insurance Vehicle Insurance Other Insurance 
APEs z-stat. APEs z-stat. APEs z-stat. APEs z-stat. 
Female head 0.052 0.36 0.0009 2.32** -0.005 -0.08 -0.014 -2.32** 
Household size 0.049 2.85*** 0.00008 0.63 0.001 0.40 0.004 1.35 
Married head 0.043 0.42 0.0001 0.91 0.018 2.22** -0.169 -5.32*** 
Ratio of ill 
household members 
0.346 1.52 -0.00009 -1.23 0.143 9.39*** -0.005 -0.70 
Age -0.034 -3.95*** -0.00006 -2.84*** -0.004 -6.33*** -0.0004 -0.15 
Age squared 0.0004 4.12*** 7.98e-07 3.37*** 0.00004 5.35*** -7.05e-06 -0.22 
Education of 
household head 
(base: tertiary 
education) 
        
No or only primary 
education 
0.358 3.02*** 0.049 3.97*** 0.025 1.73* 0.003 0.31 
Secondary 
Education 
0.079 2.44** 0.0024 2.22** 0.0009 0.20 0.006 0.91 
Occupation of 
household head 
(base: formal 
employee/employer) 
        
Head is self-
employed 
0.085 1.79* -0.0003 -2.85*** -0.009 -1.90* 0.013 1.84* 
Head is unemployed 0.006 0.01 -0.0003 -5.09*** -0.0003 -0.05 0.011 2.12* 
Asset Index  -  -    - 
Asset Quintiles 
(base: the richest 
20%) 
        
Quintile 1 -0.248 -8.50*** -0.001 -4.27*** -0.063 -6.59*** -0.017 -1.91* 
Quintile 2 -0.224 -5.67*** -0.001 -3.55*** -0.029 -6.31*** -0.018 -1.79* 
Quintile 3 -0.182 -5.12*** -0.0005 -5.04*** -0.029 -7.88*** -0.013 -1.07 
Quintile 4 0.006 0.20 -0.0003 -3.67*** -0.008 -1.33 -0.0003 -0.02 
Land Ownership 0.067 1.29 -0.00004 -0.14 0.006 1.11 -0.011 -1.08 
Remittance 0.119 0.94 -0.0001 -0.91 0.001 0.18 0.132 1.94** 
Self risk assessment 0.009 0.30 0.0002 3.00*** 0.010 1.38 0.004 1.59 
Household’s risk 
experience (base: no 
risk experience) 
        
Experienced death 
of a household 
member 
0.119 0.87 -0.00009 -0.33 -0.002 -0.28 0.019 1.02 
Experienced severe 
illness 
-0.078 -1.61 0.006 1.28 -0.016 -3.74*** -0.089 -0.94 
Experienced other 
severe shock 
-0.167 -4.20*** -0.0001 -0.19 -0.029 -3.53*** -0.019 -2.23** 
Regional dummies Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
Est. correlation 
coeff. 
ρ21 = 0.08 0.52 ρ31 = -0.05 -0.23 
ρ41 = -
0.14 
-1.26 
ρ32 = -
0.29 
-1.35 
ρ42 = 0.03 0.29 ρ43 = -0.73 -3.40***     
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Results of the multivariate probit model are estimated by SML with 20 pseudorandom 
draws. The z-statistics refer to the estimated coefficients and are based on robust standard 
errors. Average partial effects (APEs) are calculated with respect to the marginal probability of 
each type of insurance. The model also includes a constant. Sample size is N = 330 observations. 
*** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
 
